Colm O hEigeartaigh

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Colm O hEigeartaigh
Updated: 18 hours 30 min ago

SAML SecurityPolicy enforcement in CXF 2.4.2

Mon, 09/12/2011 - 14:44
Apache CXF 2.4.2 was released recently. In this blog post I want to delve into how CXF 2.4.2 enforces WS-SecurityPolicy expressions relating to SAML Assertions on the inbound side.

There are two policy expressions relating to SAML Assertions, the SamlToken and IssuedToken policy assertions. On the outbound side, the SamlToken expression will trigger a CallbackHandler to obtain a SAML Assertion to insert into the outbound security header, and the IssuedToken expression will use the STSClient to obtain a SAML Assertion from a Security Token Service (STS).

On the inbound side, any SAML Assertion received as part of the security header will be parsed initially by WSS4J. If the assertion is signed, then the signature is verified. If the confirmation method of the Subject of the Assertion is "holder-of-key", then WSS4J will parse the Subject KeyInfo and extract whatever credentials it can find, i.e. secret key or an X509Certificate. If no credential is found (or understood), then the default behaviour is to throw an exception. If the confirmation method is "holder-of-key", then the default behaviour (which is configurable) is to enforce that the Assertion is signed. Finally, WSS4J verifies trust in a certificate that was used to sign the assertion.

After WSS4J is done with validating a received SAML Assertion, CXF does some additional validation according to the configured security policy. For more information on any of the following terms (holder-of-key, sender-vouches, etc.), please consult the SAML Token Profile 1.1 specification.

1) SamlToken policy

If a SamlToken policy is used, the version of the received Assertion (1.1 or 2.0) is checked against the policy, e.g. if <sp:WssSamlV20Token11 /> is configured in the SAMLToken policy then the received Assertion must be a SAML 2.0 Assertion. Two checks are then done on the received Assertion, depending on what the subject confirmation method is.
  • Holder-of-key: If the subject confirmation method is "holder-of-key", there must be some proof-of-possession of the key associated with the subject of the assertion. CXF will enforce that either the key was used to sign some portion of the SOAP request, or alternatively the subject credential of the SAML Assertion must match a client certificate credential when 2-way TLS is used.
  • Sender-Vouches: If the subject confirmation method is "sender-vouches", then CXF will enforce that the SAML Assertion and SOAP Body are signed by the same signature. Alternatively, it will check that 2-way TLS is used.
2) IssuedToken Policy

If an IssuedToken policy is used, then the receiver is expecting to get a SAML Assertion that is issued by a third-party security service. If the subject confirmation method of the Assertion is "holder-of-key", then it does the same check as described above for a SamlToken policy. Additionally, if a "<sp:RequestSecurityTokenTemplate..../>" policy is configured, it will attempt to match the received Assertion against the RSTTemplate parameters:
  • TokenType: If a TokenType parameter is specified in the template, it will match this against the version of the received Assertion. For example, if the TokenType is "", then the Assertion must be a SAML 1.1 Assertion.
  • KeyType: If a KeyType parameter is specified in the template which ends with "SymmetricKey", then the subject of the Assertion must contain a secret key. If the KeyType parameter ends with "PublicKey", then the Subject must contain a Certificate or PublicKey.
Here is an example of a RequestSecurityTokenTemplate:


Issuer or IssuerName policies are not yet enforced, this will probably be done in a future version of CXF.
Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

Apache WSS4J 1.5.12 and 1.6.2 released

Thu, 08/18/2011 - 15:21
Apache WSS4J 1.5.12 and 1.6.2 have been released.

WSS4J 1.5.12 is a bug-fix release, which fixes some problems relating to future-dated Timestamps, fixes a bug with deriving keys from UsernameTokens, and fixes a concurrency issue with EnvelopeIdResolver, amongst other things.

WSS4J 1.6.2 contains some enhancements for SAML Token creation, fixes a bug with deriving keys from UsernameTokens, adds initial support for the Kerberos Token Profile 1.1, and fixes some problems relating to signature verification in certain containers.
Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

SAML token creation in Apache WSS4J 1.6

Tue, 08/16/2011 - 20:10
WSS4J 1.6 uses Opensaml2 to create and parse SAML Assertions. WSS4J ships with a library that wraps the Opensaml API to greatly simplify the process of creating a SAML Assertion. The user implements a CallbackHandler instance which must be able to handle a WSS4J SAMLCallback object. and set certain properties on this object. WSS4J then parses the properties that were set on the object and creates a SAML Assertion accordingly. In this blog post we will examine the process of creating a SAML Assertion by populating a SAMLCallback object in more detail.

1) Obtain a SAMLCallback object

First off, a SAMLCallback object must be obtained in the CallbackHandler implementation, e.g.:

if (callbacks[i] instanceof SAMLCallback) {
    SAMLCallback callback = (SAMLCallback) callbacks[i];

2) Set the SAML Version

The first thing to do is to set the desired SAML Version of the Assertion you want to create on the SAMLCallback object, e.g.:


This method takes an org.opensaml.common.SAMLVersion object. For normal purposes, it will be one of the following:
  • SAMLVersion.VERSION_11
  • SAMLVersion.VERSION_20
The default value in SAMLCallback is VERSION_11.

3) Set the Issuer

The next thing to do is to set the issuer (String) name of the token, e.g.:


4) Set the Subject

The next thing to do is to set the Subject of the Assertion. WSS4J defines a SubjectBean which encapsulates a SAML Subject. The Subject Name, NameQualifier, NameIDFormat and ConfirmationMethod Strings can be set on the SubjectBean instance. The NameIDFormat and ConfirmationMethod values that can be set are largely defined in the SAML1Constants and SAML2Constants classes. The default value for the SubjectBean NameIDFormat is SAML1Constants.NAMEID_FORMAT_UNSPECIFIED. Both constants classes contain the following values that can be used for the ConfirmationMethod value:
  •  SAML[1|2]Constants.CONF_BEARER
  •  SAML[1|2]Constants.CONF_HOLDER_KEY
In addition to this, WSS4J defines a KeyInfoBean that can be set on the SubjectBean, which represents a KeyInfo structure that will be embedded in a SAML Subject. There are a number of different ways to set the KeyInfo value:
  • A DOM element can be defined for a pre-existing KeyInfo element
  • A PublicKey object can be used
  • An X.509 Certificate can be used
For the latter two cases, the KeyInfoBean contains a CERT_IDENTIFIER enum which defines how the PublicKey or X.509 Certificate will be output. The following values can be configured:
  • X509_CERT: An X509Certificate element will be output
  • X509_ISSUER_SERIAL: An X509 IssuerSerial element will be output
  • KEY_VALUE: A KeyValue element will be output
The default value in the KeyInfoBean is X509_CERT. Here is a sample that shows how to create a SubjectBean:

SubjectBean subjectBean = new SubjectBean();
KeyInfoBean keyInfo = new KeyInfoBean();

Finally, it remains to store the SubjectBean instance in the SAMLCallback object. A SAML 2.0 Assertion contains a single Subject, and so for this case the SubjectBean instance can be set directly on the SAMLCallback, e.g.:


For a SAML 1.1 Assertion, the Subject can be in a SubjectStatement (in which case it can be set directly on the SAMLCallback), or it can be embedded in one of the other statements which we will cover next.

5) Create and set a Statement

WSS4J contains a number of beans to create Statements for SAML Assertions, that can be set on a SAMLCallback object. They can be used in either SAML 1.1 or SAML 2.0 Assertions, with the caveat that SubjectBean instances are not used with statements in SAML 2.0.

a) Attribute Statements

WSS4J contains an AttributeStatementBean for creating Attribute statements. This contains a SubjectBean (for the SAML 1.1 case), and a list of AttributeBean objects. An attribute simple name, qualified name, and name format Strings can be set on the AttributeBean, as well as a list of attribute value Strings. Here is an example of creating and adding an AttributeStatement to a SAMLCallback object:

AttributeStatementBean attrBean = new AttributeStatementBean();
AttributeBean attributeBean = new AttributeBean();

b) Authentication Statements

WSS4J contains an AuthenticationStatementBean for creating Authentication statements. For SAML 1.1 a SubjectBean instance can be set on this object. In addition to this, an authentication instant and authentication method can be set, as well as a SubjectLocalityBean object and a session index String. Various authentication method Strings are defined in the SAML1Constants and SAML2Constants given above. Here is an example:

AuthenticationStatementBean authBean = new AuthenticationStatementBean();
SubjectLocalityBean subjectLocality = new SubjectLocalityBean();
authBean.setAuthenticationMethod("Password");     callback.setAuthenticationStatementData(Collections.singletonList(authBean));

c) Authorization Decision Statements

WSS4J contains an AuthDecisionStatementBean for creating Authorization Decision Statements. For SAML 1.1 a SubjectBean instance can be set on this object. A Decision enum can be set (PERMIT, INDETERMINATE, DENY), as well as a resource String, evidence Object, and a list of ActionBeans, which in turn contain an action namespace and action contents. Here is an example:

AuthDecisionStatementBean authzBean = new AuthDecisionStatementBean();
ActionBean actionBean = new ActionBean();
authzBean.setResource(resource);  callback.setAuthDecisionStatementData(Collections.singletonList(authzBean));
6) Create a Conditions object

Finally, a ConditionsBean object can be used to specify a set of Conditions on the SAML Assertion. This is optional, as by default a Conditions element will be generated with a NotBefore value of the present instant and a NotOnOrAfter value corresponding to 5 minutes into the future. This can be changed by creating a ConditionsBean and specifying either "notBefore" and "notAfter" dates, or else a token period in minutes in which the token is valid. It is also possible to specify an audience restriction URI on the ConditionsBean object. Here is an example:

ConditionsBean conditions = new ConditionsBean();

For some examples of CallbackHandlers used to create SAML Assertions, check out the following CallbackHandlers used in the WSS4J unit tests - SAML1AuthnHOKHandler, SAML1CallbackHandler and SAML2CallbackHandler.
Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

WS-Trust 1.4 support in CXF

Mon, 08/15/2011 - 17:43
Apache CXF has had support for sending a WS-Trust 1.4 ActAs element as part of a RequestSecurityToken call to a Security Token Service (STS) since the 2.2.10 release. To quote from the WS-Trust 1.4 specification:
This OTPIONAL (sic) element indicates that the requested token is expected to contain information about the identity represented by the content of this element and the token requestor intends to use the returned token to act as this identity. The identity that the requestor wants to act-as is specified by placing a security token or <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element within the <wst:ActAs> element.The object to be placed in an ActAs element can be set by the SecurityConstants tag "STS_TOKEN_ACT_AS" on the Message properties. Prior to Apache CXF 2.4.1 the ActAs object could either be an XML String or else a DOM Element. See the following CXF wiki page for more information.

Several enhancements were made in CXF 2.4.1 as part of this JIRA. First of all, support was added for OnBehalfOf. To quote from the spec again:
This OPTIONAL element indicates that the requestor is making the request on behalf of another.  The identity on whose behalf the request is being made is specified by placing a security token, <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element, or <wsa:EndpointReference> element within the <wst:OnBehalfOf> element. The requestor MAY provide proof of possession of the key associated with the OnBehalfOf identity by including a signature in the RST security header generated using the OnBehalfOf token that signs the primary signature of the RST (i.e. endorsing supporting token concept from WS-SecurityPolicy). Additional signed supporting tokens describing the OnBehalfOf context MAY also be included within the RST security header.The object to be placed in an OnBehalfOf element can be set by the SecurityConstants tag "STS_TOKEN_ON_BEHALF_OF" on the Message properties. Similar to ActAs, this object can be an XML String or a DOM Element. In addition to this, the object for both ActAs and OnBehalfOf can now be a CallbackHandler instance. The CallbackHandler implementation must be able to process a DelegationCallback object, which has access to the current CXF Message, and returns a DOM Element to the STSClient for insertion into either ActAs or OnBehalfOf.

Two sample CallbackHandler implementations are shipped with CXF 2.4.1 that can be used for either OnBehalfOf or ActAs. The ReceivedTokenCallbackHandler obtains the previously received message from the current message property of the DelegationCallback object, and extracts a token that has been received in that message (SAML Token/UsernameToken/BinarySecurityToken). This token is then used as the delegation token. This CallbackHandler implementation is useful as part of an WS-Trust intermediary scenario. Secondly, the WSSUsernameCallbackHandler obtains a username via the jax-ws property "ws-security.username" (SecurityConstants.USERNAME), and creates a wsse:UsernameToken (with no password) to be used as the delegation token.
Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

Custom token validation in Apache CXF 2.4

Tue, 06/28/2011 - 15:37
A previous blog post has covered validators in Apache WSS4J 1.6, why they were introduced, what default implementations ship with WSS4J, etc. It ends with a paragraph on how to use a custom Validator implementation with Apache CXF 2.4. This post expands further on this topic.

1) Use-cases for custom Token Validation

Let's consider first of all the use-cases for specifying a custom Validator implementation in CXF. When a security header is being processed by WSS4J, it delegates each security token to a Processor implementation, depending on the QName of the token. In WSS4J 1.6, Processors do not do any validation of extracted credentials from a token, they merely process it, make sure it meets basic requirements, etc. Validation is delegated to a Validator interface which is associated with that Processor implementation.

However, there are many possible use-cases where a user may wish to replace or remove or extend the default validation behaviour associated with a particular security token. Some examples include:
  1. Validating a UsernameToken, where the CallbackHandler implementation does not have access to the password.
  2. Validating a BinarySecurityToken of some custom type.
  3. Validating the attributes of a received SAML Assertion
  4. Validating a Timestamp in a more tolerant manner than the default.
  5. Dispatching a received security token to a third-party security service for validation/authentication.
2) Configuring custom Validators in CXF
    The CXF SecurityConstants class (javadoc) defines some configuration items to override the default validators used to validate a received security token. The values associated with each configuration option must correspond to an implementation of the Validator interface. The configuration tags are:
    1. "ws-security.ut.validator" - Override UsernameToken validation.
    2. "ws-security.saml1.validator" - Override SAML1 token validation.
    3. "ws-security.saml2.validator" - Override SAML2 token validation.
    4. "ws-security.timestamp.validator" - Override Timestamp validation.
    5. "ws-security.signature.validator" - Override trust verification on a signature
    6. "ws-security.bst.validator" - Override BinarySecurityToken validation.
    To disable the validation of a particular token, specify the NoOpValidator as the value of the configuration tag corresponding to that token.

    3) Using Validators with WS-Trust

    To see the power and flexibility of the approach of separating processing from validation, consider the STSTokenValidator that ships with CXF 2.4. This validator implementation has the ability to dispatch a received BinarySecurityToken, UsernameToken, or SAML Assertion to an STS (Security Token Service) for validation via WS-Trust. On invocation, it delegates the credential to another validator (STSSamlAssertionValidator). This validator essentially catches an exception caused by a signature validation failure of the SAML Assertion and sets a flag. Only if signature validation is unsuccessful does the STSTokenValidator dispatch the token to the STS for validation.

    An example of how to configure the STSTokenValidator to validate a SAML1 Assertion against an STS in spring is as follows:

    <jaxws:endpoint ...>
        <entry key="ws-security.saml1.validator">
          <bean class=""/>
        <entry key="ws-security.sts.client">
          <bean class="">
            <constructor-arg ref="cxf"/>
            <property name="wsdlLocation" value="..."/>
            <property name="serviceName" value=".../>
            <property name="endpointName" value="..."/>

    The STSTokenValidator also has the ability to obtain a transformed token from the STS and store it in the credential, where it is available as part of the WSSecurityEngineResult under the TAG_TRANSFORMED_TOKEN tag.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    WS-SecurityPolicy/SAML sample in Talend Service Factory 2.4.0

    Fri, 06/10/2011 - 23:05
    In this post I will walk through the WS-SecurityPolicy sample that ships with Talend Service Factory 2.4.0. This sample shows how to secure a web service provider using both a UsernameToken and a SAML Assertion. For this post I will concentrate exclusively on the SAML case.

    1) Download the artifacts

    Go here and download Talend Service Factory 2.4.0. When this is done, go here and download the Talend Service Factory 2.4.0 examples (registration required). Extract the examples into the Talend Service Factory (TSF) install directory ($TSF_HOME). Finally, this sample requires that unlimited strength security policies be installed in the JDK.

    2) Build and run the sample

    Go to $TSF_HOME/examples/jaxws-ws-secpol and start with the README.txt. Run "mvn eclipse:eclipse" to generate eclipse projects, and "mvn install" to build and install the various modules. There are two options to run the sample.

    2.1) Run the sample using maven

    To start the service go to the service folder, and run "mvn exec:java". To run the test then go to the client folder and also run "mvn exec:java".

    2.2) Run the sample in Karaf

    To deploy the service and run the client in an OSGi environment, we can take advantage of the Karaf distribution that ships with TSF. Go to $TSF_HOME/container/bin and run the "karaf" binary. Install the three bundles in Karaf with:
    • install mvn:com.talend.sf.examples.jaxws-ws-secpol/ws-secpol-common/1.0
    • install mvn:com.talend.sf.examples.jaxws-ws-secpol/ws-secpol-server/1.0
    • install mvn:com.talend.sf.examples.jaxws-ws-secpol/ws-secpol-client/1.0
    Each of these commands will print out a bundle id. Run the sample by invoking "start <id>" for each of the three bundle ids in turn.

    3) The Service Provider

    3.1) The Security Policy

    The Service endpoint is secured via the following security policy fragment, which is defined in the WSDL ("ws-secpol-wsdl/greeter.wsdl" in the common folder):

      <sp:AsymmetricBinding xmlns:sp=".../ws-securitypolicy/200702">
              <sp:X509Token sp:IncludeToken=".../AlwaysToRecipient">
                  <sp:RequireThumbprintReference />
                  <sp:WssX509V3Token10 />
              <sp:X509Token sp:IncludeToken=".../Never">
                  <sp:RequireThumbprintReference />
                  <sp:WssX509V3Token10 />
      <sp:SignedSupportingTokens xmlns:sp=".../ws-securitypolicy/200702">
          <sp:SamlToken sp:IncludeToken=".../AlwaysToRecipient">

    This Security Policy defines that the Asymmetric Binding is to be used in communication with the service provider, i.e. that the client must sign the request using its private key, and include the corresponding X509 Certificate in the security header of the request, and encrypt the request using the public key of the service provider. Authentication is performed on the basis of trust verification of the client's certificate, as the client illustrates proof-of-possession by signing some part of the request.

    In addition to the Asymmetric Binding, the policy requires that a SAML 2.0 Assertion must be included in the service request, and it must be signed by the signature defined by the Asymmetric Binding policy. The (policy-driven) ability to add a SAML Assertion to a SOAP Request is new to Apache CXF 2.4.

    Finally, the WSDL defines input and output policies (not included here), which specify that the SOAP Body must be signed and encrypted, and that all of the addressing headers must be signed if present.

    3.2) The configuration

    The standalone (maven-driven) case is configured entirely in code. The various security configuration items are added as properties to the JAX-WS Endpoint object. The same security configuration items are also used for the case of deploying the service provider in Karaf, except that it is all driven through spring, e.g.:

    <jaxws:server id="SAMLGreeter" xmlns:ns1="..."
        <entry key="ws-security.callback-handler" value="..."/>
        <entry key="" value="..."/>
        <entry key="" value="..."/>
        <entry key="ws-security.saml2.validator" value="..."/>

    Four security-related configuration options are used for the service provider. "ws-security.callback-handler" points to a CallbackHandler implementation that is used to supply a password for extracting a private key from a keystore to decrypt the request and sign the response. "" refers to a properties file which contains configuration options for loading the keystore used for encryption. Similarly, "" refers to a properties file for signature creation (and decryption).

    "ws-security.saml2.validator" is a configuration tag new to CXF 2.4, and refers to an instance of the WSS4J Validator interface. The Validator interface is used in WSS4J to validate received security tokens. In this case, we are extending the default SAML2 Token Validation with a custom Validator. This Validator does some additional verification on the received token, namely checking who the issuer is, checking that the confirmation method is "sender-vouches", and checking that the Assertion contains an AttributeStatement, with an Attribute "attribute-role" containing a value "authenticated-client".

    All of these configuration tags are defined in the SecurityConstants class in CXF.

    4) The client

    When the client wants to invoke on the service provider, it parses the security policy described above in the WSDL. As with the service provider, the client standalone case is configured entirely in code. For the case of deploying the client in Karaf, it is configured in spring as follows: 

    <jaxws:client id="samlgreeter" wsdlLocation="..." serviceClass="..."
      xmlns:ns1="" serviceName="ns1:SecureGreeterService"
        <entry key="ws-security.signature.username" value="..."/>
        <entry key="ws-security.encryption.username" value="..."/>
        <entry key="ws-security.callback-handler"><bean class="..."/></entry>
        <entry key="" value="..."/>
        <entry key="" value="..."/>
        <entry key="ws-security.saml-callback-handler" value="..."/>

    "ws-security.callback-handler", "" and "" have been covered in the section on configuring the service provider. "ws-security.signature.username" refers to the keystore alias of the private key to use to sign the request, and "ws-security.encryption.username" refers to the keystore alias to use to encrypt the request.

    "ws-security.saml-callback-handler" is a configuration tag new to CXF 2.4, and refers to a CallbackHandler which will supply WSS4J with the information to create a SAML Assertion. This sample ships with a CallbackHandler that creates a simple SAML 2.0 Assertion with a subject confirmation method of "sender-vouches". It adds an Attribute to the Assertion that conveys to the Web Service Provider that the client has authenticated an external user in some way (not shown as part of this sample), and has assigned the attribute role of "authenticated-client" to the external user. The assertion that will be generated from this CallbackHandler instance will be signed by the client, as per the policy definition ("SignedSupportingTokens").

    5) The Client Request

    The security header of the client request contains a BinarySecurityToken which contains the certificate to use to verify the signature. It also contains a Timestamp, an EncryptedKey which is used to encrypt the SOAP Body, a SAML2 Assertion, and a Signature which signs the Timestamp, Assertion and encrypted SOAP Body. The Assertion looks like this:

    <saml2:Assertion xmlns:saml2="..." xmlns:xsi="..." ID="..." IssueInstant="..."
      Version="2.0" xsi:type="saml2:AssertionType">
       <saml2:NameID Format=...:unspecified">uid=auth_client</saml2:NameID>
       <saml2:SubjectConfirmation Method="...:sender-vouches">
     <saml2:Conditions NotBefore="..." NotOnOrAfter="..."/>
       <saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="attribute-role" NameFormat="...">
         <saml2:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">

    The service provider processes the received security header as follows:
    1. It checks that the Timestamp is valid
    2. It uses its private key to decrypt the EncryptedKey, and then uses the decrypted key to decrypt the SOAP Body.
    3. It verifies that the Assertion is valid, and passes the Assertion to the custom Validator defined above to validate the contents of the Assertion.
    4. It verifies that the certificate defined in the BinarySecurityToken can validate the signature, verifies trust in the certificate, and checks that each of the References of the signature produce the correct digest.
    At this point security processing is complete, and the service provider constructs a secured response to the client.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    WSS4J 1.6.1 released

    Wed, 06/08/2011 - 15:11
    Apache WSS4J 1.6.1 has been released. The distribution can be downloaded here, and the list of issues that have been fixed is here. There are a number of bug fixes to the new functionality introduced in the 1.6.0 release, including some fixes to the SAML Assertion creation code, and a fix to get WSS4J 1.6 working with the IBM JDK. A noteworthy new feature is support for CRLs, as documented by a previous blog post.

    In other news, my employer has published a short questionnaire to find out what topics users of open-source integration software are interested in learning about. So for example if you are interested in hearing more from me on enabling security in Apache CXF, navigate to the CXF part of the survey and select the appropriate checkbox for "WS-Security in Apache CXF".
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    CRL support in WSS4J 1.6.1

    Mon, 05/30/2011 - 16:12
    Support for Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) has been a long sought feature in WSS4J, and will arrive in the imminent release of WSS4J 1.6.1. This will ensure that the certificate used to validate a signature is not revoked by the issuing Certificate Authority.

    Support for CRLs is covered by the task WSS-278. The default behaviour is that certificate revocation is not enabled for backwards compatibility reasons. Two parameters must be configured to enable certificate revocation. The first is that the WSHandlerConstants property "enableRevocation" must be set to "true", if WSS4J is being used in the context of WSHandler. If the handler architecture is not being used, then a new method has been added to the Crypto interface for signature trust validation which explicitly enables certificate revocation:
    • public boolean verifyTrust(X509Certificate[] certs, boolean enableRevocation) throws WSSecurityException;
    The previous verifyTrust(certs) method has been deprecated. Please bear in mind that any custom Crypto implementation must be updated with the new method, or else you will face a compilation error on upgrading to WSS4J 1.6.1.

    The second is that the Crypto instance that is used must be supplied with CRL information. This can be done in a number of different ways. The default Crypto instance that ships with WSS4J (Merlin), has a new configuration property:
    • The location of an (X509) CRL file to be loaded via CertificateFactory.generateCRL(...).
    Merlin also has two new accessor methods to set/get a CertStore object to be used for CRL checking (i.e. setCRLCertStore(CertStore crlCertStore)), if you wish to supply CRL information programatically to the Crypto instance.

    Update: You can see a test for this feature here.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    Apache XML Security for Java 1.4.5 released

    Fri, 05/27/2011 - 15:53
    Apache XML Security for Java 1.4.5 has been released:
    The Apache Santuario team are pleased to announce the release of
    version 1.4.5 of the Apache XML Security for Java library. This
    release fixes a thread safety issue in the ResourceResolver, and a
    regression in signature generation for the Canonical XML 1.1
    algorithm, as well as a number of other bug fixes.

    Please see the release notes for more information:

    You can download the library here:
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    Talend ESB Standard Edition released

    Wed, 05/18/2011 - 19:36
    Last week the Talend ESB Standard Edition was released:
    A core component of the unified platform for data services, Talend ESB includes messaging, Web services, mediation and adapters in an open and standards-based offering used to integrate distributed systems across functional, enterprise and/or geographic boundaries. Powered by leading Apache open source integration projects Apache CXF, Apache Camel and Apache ActiveMQ, Talend ESB is a versatile and flexible ESB that allows organizations to address any integration challenge, from simple departmental projects to complex, heterogeneous IT environments.Of particular interest to readers of this blog might be the Security Token Service (STS) framework which ships as part of Talend ESB. More on this in a future blog post.

    To download Talend ESB Standard Edition go here. For more information, see the datasheet here.

    In other Talend-related news, Talend is now a sponsor of the Apache Software Foundation.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    WS-Trust sample in Talend Service Factory 2.4.0

    Wed, 05/11/2011 - 18:18
    In this post I will walk through the WS-Trust sample that ships with Talend Service Factory 2.4.0.

    1) Download the artifacts

    Go here and download Talend Service Factory 2.4.0. When this is done, go here and download the Talend Service Factory 2.4.0 examples (registration required). Extract the examples into the Talend Service Factory (TSF) install directory ($TSF_HOME).

    2) Build and run the sample

    Go to $TSF_HOME/examples/jaxws-ws-trust and start with the README.txt. Run "mvn eclipse:eclipse" to generate eclipse projects, and "mvn install" to build and install the various modules.

    Both the CXF service provider and Metro STS used in this sample are deployed in Tomcat. To see how to configure Maven to install/uninstall these artifacts in Tomcat follow the instructions here. Finally, you need to make sure that the path to the keystores is correct for the Metro STS - follow the instructions in the README.txt for this.

    Start Tomcat, and from the sts-war folder run "mvn install tomcat:deploy". Run the same command from the service-war folder to deploy the CXF service provider in Tomcat.

    Finally to run the test, go to the client folder and run "mvn install exec:exec". You also have the option of running the client in Karaf (follow the instructions in the README.txt).

    3) The sample

    Three service invocations take place as part of this sample. For simplicity, I'll just concentrate on the third one, which shows how a SAML2 Assertion is used in a WS-Trust scenario.

    3.1) The Service Provider

    We'll start with the Service Provider, as the client will use the security policies defined in the WSDL of the Service Provider to access the STS. The Service is spring-loaded via the following configuration:

    <jaxws:endpoint id="doubleitsaml2"
             <entry key="ws-security.callback-handler" value="..."/>
             <entry key="" value="..."/>
             <entry key="" value="false"/>

    Three properties are required for the endpoint. The CallbackHandler implementation is required to provider the password used to access the private key in the Keystore, which is in turn configured in the "" file. The "" configuration turns off Basic Security Profile 1.1 compliance enforcement. This is required as the Metro STS generates a non BSP-compliant SAML Assertion (try removing this line, redeploying the service provider in tomcat and see what happens when the test is re-run).

    The WSDL (DoubleIt.wsdl) contains the security policies for the service provider. It requires that the input and output SOAP Body elements must be signed and encrypted, and that all of the addressing headers must be signed in both directions. It also contains the following policy snippet:

            <sp:IssuedToken sp:IncludeToken="...AlwaysToRecipient">

    This SecurityPolicy snippet defines that the communication with the service provider is secured via the SymmetricBinding, i.e. that it is secured via a secret key. The ProtectionToken policy describes how the secret key in turn is conveyed to the service provider in a secure way. In this example, it defines an IssuedToken policy, which is always sent to the recipient (service provider). Once the client sees this policy, it will know that it must contact a Security Token Service (STS) via the WS-Trust protocol to obtain a (issued) token that will convey the symmetric key to the service provider.

    The IssuedToken policy has a RequestSecurityTokenTemplate policy, which the client will copy verbatim when contacting the STS for a security token. It describes the token type that is required (a SAML2 Assertion), the KeyType conveyed in the Assertion (Symmetric Key), and the size of the symmetric key (256 bits). It also contains an Issuer policy which describes how the STS may be contacted via a wsa EndpointReferenceType.

    3.2) The Security Token Service (STS)

    The STS used in this sample is the Metro STS. The port is secured with the following security policy binding:

             <sp:X509Token sp:IncludeToken=".../AlwaysToRecipient">
                 <sp:WssX509V3Token10 />
             <sp:X509Token sp:IncludeToken=".../Never">
                 <sp:WssX509V3Token10 />
                 <sp:RequireIssuerSerialReference />

    This Security Policy defines that the Asymmetric Binding is to be used in communication with the STS, i.e. that the client must sign the request using its private key, and include the corresponding X509 Certificate in the security header of the request, and encrypt the request using the public key of the STS. Authentication is performed on the basis of trust verification of the client's certificate, as the client illustrates proof-of-possession by signing some part of the request.

    The WSDL of the STS also contains a "STSConfiguration" policy fragment, which defines that the issued key is encrypted, and lists the service provider endpoints, including the corresponding public keys.

    3.3) The client

    When the client wants to invoke on the service provider, it parses the security policy described above in the WSDL, and sees that it must first obtain an IssuedToken from a STS before it can construct the service request. The client is configured in spring as follows:

    <jaxws:client name="{...}DoubleItPortSAML2" createdFromAPI="true">
        <entry key="ws-security.sts.client">
          <bean class="">
            <constructor-arg ref="cxf"/>
            <property name="wsdlLocation" value="DoubleItSTSService.wsdl"/>
            <property name="serviceName" value="{...}DoubleItSTSService"/>
            <property name="endpointName" value="{...}IDoubleItSTS..Port"/>
            <property name="properties">
                <entry key="ws-security.signature.username" value="..."/>
                <entry key="ws-security.callback-handler" value="..."/>
                <entry key="" value="..."/>
                <entry key="" value="..."/>
                <entry key="ws-security.encryption.username" value="..."/>

    The STSClient bean contains the configuration required to contact the STS. The client parses the WSDL of the STS, and uses the supplied configuration parameters to construct a request that is secured by the Asymmetric Binding, as discussed above. This request is done via the WS-Trust protocol.

    3.4) The STS request

    In the SOAP Body of the request is the following information (decrypted):

        <wst:BinarySecret Type=".../Nonce">...</wst:BinarySecret>

    The SecondaryParameters element is copied verbatim from the RequestSecurityTokenTemplate defined in the policy of the service provider. The RequestType element defines an "Issue" URI. AppliesTo refers to the address of the service provider. Entropy contains some client-generated entropy (which the STS will combine with its own Entropy to form a symmetric key), using the ComputedKeyAlgorithm URI.

    3.5) The STS response

    The response from the STS contains the following (decrypted) SOAP Body. It contains the token type of the requested token, the token itself, different ways of referring to the requested token, some entropy that the client can use to recreate the symmetric key, the lifetime of the requested token, etc:

          <trust:BinarySecret Type=".../Nonce">...</trust:BinarySecret>

    The requested security token that is returned above is reproduced here. Note that the SubjectConfirmation Method is "holder-of-key", meaning that the client must illustrate proof of possession of the key contained in the EncryptedKey element of the Assertion. The EncryptedKey element is encrypted using the service provider's public key.

    <saml2:Assertion ID="..." IssueInstant="..." Version="2.0">
        <saml2:NameID NameQualifier="...">...</saml2:NameID>
        <saml2:SubjectConfirmation Method="...:cm:holder-of-key">
     <saml2:Conditions NotBefore="..." NotOnOrAfter="..."></saml2:Conditions>

    3.5) The Service Provider request

    Once the client receives the Issued Token from the STS, it recreates the symmetric key needed to communicate with the service provider, by combining the entropy received from the STS with its own entropy to form the session key. The (decrypted) SAML2 Assertion is inserted into the security header "as is". The symmetric key is referenced in the request via the following structure:

    <ds:KeyInfo Id="...">
      <wsse:SecurityTokenReference  wsse11:TokenType="...#SAMLV2.0" >
        <wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="...#SAMLID">...</wsse:KeyIdentifier>

    The Service Provider verifies the signature of the STS on the SAML Assertion, and then decrypts the EncryptedKey fragment using its private key, to obtain the symmetric key used to decrypt/verify the client request. As the confirmation method is "holder-of-key", the Service Provider ensures that the same key was used to sign some portion of the request, thus proving that the client is in possession of the key.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    Talend Service Factory 2.4.0 released

    Fri, 04/29/2011 - 16:36
    Talend Service Factory 2.4.0 has been released. It's based on Apache CXF 2.4.0, and so contains all of the security features in WSS4J 1.6.0, as well as the extensive support for SAML Assertions in CXF 2.4.0, that I have been blogging about for the last while.

    In addition to this, some examples are available for download, which illustrate how to get these (security) features working in an OSGi container. A lot of work has gone into making sure that security libraries such as Apache Santuario, Apache WSS4J and Opensaml can be used in an OSGi environment, so I recommend checking the examples out to see how it can be done.

    See Glen's blog for more information on the security examples. Also, see Sergey's blog for a discussion on some other examples based around transforming XML.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    SAML support in CXF 2.4.0

    Thu, 04/21/2011 - 13:28
    The recent Apache CXF 2.4.0 release contains support for creating, securing, processing and validating SAML Assertions according to the WS-Security 1.1 SAML Token Profile. As there is no documentation available as yet on this new feature, in this blog post I will go through a SAML system test in CXF 2.4.0 in detail.

    1) Running the Test

    To run the SAML system test you can do the following:

    svn co ws-security
    mvn compile mvn test -Dtest=SamlTokenTest
    2) The Client

    2.1) The Client code

    You can view the source of the tests here. There are a number of tests involving creating SAML 1.1 and 2.0 assertions, and sending them to a service provider over various security bindings (Transport/Symmetric/Asymmetric). To simplify things, we will focus on the fourth test named "testSaml2OverAsymmetric". Minus some negative tests, the basic test client invocation code is as simple as:

    SpringBusFactory bf = new SpringBusFactory();URL busFile = SamlTokenTest.class.getResource("client/client.xml");Bus bus = bf.createBus(busFile.toString());SpringBusFactory.setDefaultBus(bus);SpringBusFactory.setThreadDefaultBus(bus);
    DoubleItService service = new DoubleItService();DoubleItPortType saml2Port = service.getDoubleItSaml2AsymmetricPort();((BindingProvider)saml2Port).getRequestContext().put("ws-security.saml-callback-handler", new SamlCallbackHandler());BigInteger result = saml2Port.doubleIt(BigInteger.valueOf(25));assert result.equals(BigInteger.valueOf(50));
    2.2) The WSDL

    The service is described in the WSDL here. Take a look at the WS-SecurityPolicy called "DoubleItSaml2AsymmetricPolicy", which defines the security requirements for the "DoubleItSaml2AsymmetricPort". It defines an Asymmetric Binding, where the InitiatorToken (which defines the credential used to sign the request) is always sent to the recipient, and the RecipientToken (which defines the credential used to encrypt the request) is never sent to the recipient. Both Initiator and Recipient tokens are defined as X509 tokens. The input and output policies in the WSDL enforce that the SOAP Body must be signed using the Initiator credential, and encrypted using the Recipient credential.

    In addition to specifying an asymmetric binding, the policy also defines a SignedSupportingToken, which contains a SAML (2.0) Token which is always sent to the recipient. In order to successfully invoke on the service, the client must include a SAML 2.0 token in the security header of the request. This policy looks like:

            <sp:SamlToken sp:IncludeToken="...AlwaysToRecipient">
    2.3) The Client configuration

    The client.xml referenced in the code block above contains a jaxws:client configuration for the DoubleItSaml2AsymmetricPort. It sets the following relevant jaxws:properties:
    1. - The Crypto properties file which describes where to find the service provider's public key.
    2. ws-security.encryption.username -  The alias to use to obtain the service provider's public key from the keystore reference in the Crypto properties file above.
    3. ws-security.callback-handler - A CallbackHandler object which is expected to supply the password used to access the private key for signature creation, or decryption.
    4. - The Crypto properties file which describes where to find the client's public/private key.
    5. ws-security.signature.username - The alias to use to obtain the client's private key from the keystore reference in the Crypto properties file above.
    2.3) Creating a SAML token

    CXF 2.4.0 defines a new jaxws:property ("ws-security-saml-callback-handler") which specifies a CallbackHandler instance used to create SAML Assertions. This object is added to the outbound request context above dynamically, however it could also have been configured in the spring bean along with the other ws-security parameters. The CallbackHandler object used in this test can be seen here. The CallbackHandler implementation is expected to obtain a SAMLCallback object, and to set the appropriate values on this object, e.g. SAML version, Subject, issuer, Authentication/Authorization/Attribute Statements, etc. In the example provided in this test, it creates a SAML 2.0 assertion (by default), sets a mock issuer, subject and attribute statement, and sets a subject confirmation method of sender-vouches. Some code in WSS4J then constructs a SAML Assertion by processing this SAMLCallback object. It's easy to construct a SAML Assertion in this way, as the following (edited) code shows:

    SAMLCallback callback = (SAMLCallback) callbacks[i];callback.setSamlVersion(SAMLVersion.VERSION_20);callback.setIssuer("sts");String subjectName = "uid=sts-client,";String subjectQualifier = "";
    SubjectBean subjectBean = new SubjectBean(subjectName, subjectQualifier, SAML2Constants.CONF_SENDER_VOUCHES);callback.setSubject(subjectBean);
    AttributeStatementBean attrBean = new AttributeStatementBean();attrBean.setSubject(subjectBean);AttributeBean attributeBean = new AttributeBean();attributeBean.setSimpleName("subject-role");attributeBean.setAttributeValues(Collections.singletonList("system-user"));attrBean.setSamlAttributes(Collections.singletonList(attributeBean));callback.setAttributeStatementData(Collections.singletonList(attrBean));
    2.4) The service request

    The service request has a security header that contains the following elements:
    1. A BinarySecurityToken which consists of the X509Certificate of the client.
    2. A Timestamp.
    3. An EncryptedKey which consists of a symmetric key encrypted with the public key of the service provider, which is used to encrypt the SOAP Body.
    4. A SAML2 Assertion.
    5. A SecurityTokenReference to the SAML Assertion.
    6. A signature which signs the Timestamp, the SAML Assertion (via the SecurityTokenReference) and the (decrypted) SOAP body. The signing credential is the BinarySecurityToken element described above.
    The SAML 2.0 assertion looks like (edited):

    <saml2:Assertion ... Version="2.0">    <saml2:Issuer>sts</saml2:Issuer>    <saml2:Subject>      <saml2:NameID ...>uid=sts-client,</saml2:NameID>     <saml2:SubjectConfirmation Method="...:sender-vouches">     </saml2:SubjectConfirmation>   </saml2:Subject>   <saml2:Conditions NotBefore="..." NotOnOrAfter="..."/>    <saml2:AttributeStatement>     <saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="subject-role" ...>        <saml2:AttributeValue...>system-user</saml2:AttributeValue>     </saml2:Attribute>   </saml2:AttributeStatement></saml2:Assertion>
    One thing to note is that as the SAML Assertion has a subject confirmation method of "sender-vouches", the client will automatically add the quality-of-service requirement that the signature which covers the SOAP Body will also cover the SAML Assertion.

    3) The Server

    3.1) The Server code

    The SEI implementation is here, and the Server code itself is here.  The configuration is entirely driven through the WSDL and spring configuration, and so the code is as trivial as (edited):

    URL busFile = Server.class.getResource("server.xml");
    Bus busLocal = new SpringBusFactory().createBus(busFile);
    new Server();

    3.2) The Server configuration

    The server.xml configuration file referenced above can be seen here. The jaxws:Endpoint configuration for this port should be self-explanatory (edited):

               <entry key="ws-security.username" value="bob"/>
               <entry key="ws-security.callback-handler"
               <entry key=""
               <entry key=""
               <entry key="ws-security.encryption.username" value="alice"/>

    The server will process the request as per the security policy in the WSDL, checking that there is a signature in the security header, that covers the SOAP Body and SAML Assertion, that the SOAP Body is Encrypted, that a Timestamp is present and valid, and that the SAML Assertion is present, and is the correct version, etc. Authentication is done on the basis of trust verification of the client's X509Certificate, which was used to verify the signature element.

    The SAML Assertion is ignored beyond this point for this system test. It is saved in the security processing results, so that a custom interceptor can do some additional validation or processing on it. In a future blog post, I will describe how to validate the Assertion that has been received in some custom manner.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    CXF 2.4.0 released

    Wed, 04/20/2011 - 16:27
    Apache CXF 2.4.0 has been released. CXF 2.4.0 contains a number of new and improved features in the security space. From the release statement:
    WS-Security improvements including support for SAML2 tokens, improved
    validation of security tokens, better performance, increased WS-I Basic
    Security Profile compliance, and much more.If those new features seem familiar, it's because most of the new functionality is driven by WSS4J 1.6.0, which I've blogged extensively about over the last few months. Probably the most significant new security functionality in CXF 2.4.0 is greatly enhanced support for SAML Assertions. CXF 2.4.0 supports the ability to create, secure, process and validate SAML Assertions in accordance with the WS-Security 1.1 SAML Token Profile. I intend to blog in more detail how to use these new features in CXF 2.4.0 over the next while.

    See Dan Kulp's blog for more in-depth thoughts on the new release.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    WSS4J 1.6.0 released

    Fri, 04/15/2011 - 13:28
    WSS4J 1.6.0 has been released:
    The Apache Web Services team is pleased to announce the release of WSS4J 1.6.0. WSS4J 1.6.0 features support for SAML2 assertions, JSR-105 support, better spec compliance, performance work, support for trust-stores and a lot more besides. It is not API-compatible with the 1.5.x series of releases. For more information on the new features and changes in WSS4J 1.6.0 go to: To download WSS4J 1.6.0 go to: The Apache Web Services Team
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    [WSS4J 1.6] Introducing Validators

    Tue, 04/05/2011 - 14:18
    WSS4J 1.6 introduces the concept of a Validator, for validating credentials that have been processed by a Processor instance. This task was covered by the JIRA WSS-266.

    An inbound security header is processed by WSS4J by iterating through each child element of the header, and by calling the appropriate Processor implementation to deal with each element. In WSS4J 1.5.x, some processors perform validation on the received token (e.g. UsernameTokens), whereas others store the processing results for later verification by third-party WS-Handler implementations (e.g. Timestamp verification, Certificate trust verification). There are some problems with this approach:
    • It is not consistent, some processors perform validation, others do not.
    • There is a potential security hole, in that it is assumed third-party code will know to validate the credentials that the WSS4J processors do not validate.
    • WSS4J will continue to process the rest of the security header even if the Timestamp is invalid, or the certificate non-trusted, which could lead to denial-of-service attacks.
    • There is no separation of concerns between processing the token and validating the token. If you want to change how the token is validated, you must replace the processor instance.
    WSS4J 1.6 has moved Timestamp verification and certificate trust validation back into the processing of the security header, thus solving the first three points above. The fourth point is met by the new concept of Validators, as well as some changes to the way Processors and CallbackHandler implementations are used in WSS4J 1.6.

    In WSS4J 1.5.x, CallbackHandler implementations are used in different ways by different processors, sometimes they are expected to verify a password (as for processing UsernameTokens), and other times they are expected to supply a password (as for decryption). In WSS4J 1.6, CallbackHandler implementations are only expected to supply a password (if it exists) to the processors. The Processor implementations do not perform any validation of the security token, instead they package up the processed token, along with any (password) information extracted from the CallbackHandler, and hand it off to a Validator implementation for Validation.

    The Processor implementations get the specific Validator implementation to use via the RequestData parameter, which in turn asks a WSSConfig object for the Validator implementation. If the Validator is null, then no Validation is performed on the received token. The Processor then stores the received token as normal. WSS4J 1.6 comes with several default Validators, which are:
    • NoOpValidator: Does no processing of the credential
    • TimestampValidator: Validates a Timestamp
    • UsernameTokenValidator: Validates a UsernameToken
    • SignatureTrustValidator: Verifies trust in a signature
    • SamlAssertionValidator: Checks some HOK requirements on a SAML Assertion, and verifies trust on the (enveloped) signature.
    There are some additional WSSecurityEngineResult constants that pertain to the Validator implementations:
    • TAG_VALIDATED_TOKEN: Indicates that the token corresponding to this result has been validated by a Validator implementation. Some of the processors do not have a default Validator implementation.
    • TAG_TRANSFORMED_TOKEN: A Validator implementation may transform a credential (into a SAML Assertion) as a result of Validation. This tag holds a reference to an AssertionWrapper instance, that represents a transformed version of the validated credential.
    To validate an inbound UsernameToken in some custom way, simply associate the NoOpValidator with the UsernameToken QName in the WSSConfig of the RequestData object used to supply context information to the processors. After WSS4J has finished processing the security header, then extract the WSSecurityEngineResult instance corresponding to the WSConstants.UT action, and perform some custom validation on the token.

    An example of how to add a custom Validator implementation is the STSTokenValidator in CXF 2.4.0. The STSTokenValidator tries to validate a received SAML Assertion locally, and if that fails, it dispatches it to a Security Token Service (STS) via the WS-Trust interface for validation. It also supports validating a UsernameToken and BinarySecurityToken in the same manner. The SecurityConstants class defines some configuration tags for specifying a custom validator for inbound SAML1, SAML2, UsernameToken, BinarySecurityToken, Signature and Timestamps. The STSTokenValidator can be configured by associating it with the appropriate configuration tag.
    Categories: Colm O hEigeartaigh

    [WSS4J 1.6] SAML property changes

    Sun, 03/13/2011 - 16:02
    A previous blog entry described how WSS4J 1.6 will have support for creating, parsing, signing, verifying, etc. SAML 2 assertions. WSS4J 1.5.x had limited support for creating and signing SAML 1.1 assertions via the default SAMLIssuer implementation, combined with a properties file. These configuration values consisted of:
    • - The SAML Issuer implementation (defaults to "").
    • - The crypto properties file corresponding to the issuer crypto instance, if the assertion is to be signed.
    • - The KeyStore alias for the issuer key.
    • - The KeyStore password for the issuer key.
    • - The issuer name
    • - Whether to send the key value or the X509Certificate. Defaults to: "false".
    • - The Subject DN.
    • - The Subject qualifier.
    • - The authentication method (e.g. "password").
    • - The confirmation method, either "senderVouches" or "keyHolder".
    The configuration tags for WSS4J 1.5.x completely controlled the creation and signing of a SAML 1.1 Assertion, and hence produced only a very limited set of possible assertions.  WSS4J 1.6 takes a different approach, where the configuration tags correspond to the configuration of the issuer, i.e. whether to sign the assertion or not, the issuer name, crypto instance, etc. All instructions about how to create the SAML Assertion itself, are left to a CallbackHandler implementation.

    The following configuration tags in WSS4J 1.6 are exactly the same as in WSS4J 1.5.x:
    • - The SAML Issuer implementation (defaults to "").
    • - The crypto properties file corresponding to the issuer crypto instance, if the assertion is to be signed.
    • - The KeyStore alias for the issuer key.
    • - The KeyStore password for the issuer key.
    • - The issuer name
    • - Whether to send the key value or the X509Certificate. Defaults to: "false".
    The following configuration tags are new to WSS4J 1.6:
    • - Whether the SAMLIssuer implementation will sign the assertion or not. Defaults to: "false".
    • - The name of the SAML CallbackHandler implementation used to populate the SAML Assertion.

    [WSS4J 1.6] Basic Security Profile 1.1 compliance

    Tue, 03/08/2011 - 14:44
    The Basic Security Profile (BSP) 1.1 specification provides an industry-standard way of making sure that different WS-Security stacks can communicate with each other, by clarifying and narrowing the scope of the various WS-Security standards. WSS4J 1.5.x does not implement the BSP in any meaningful way. The WSSConfig class supports a "isWsiBSPCompliant" method (default is false), which will enable the generation of an InclusivePrefix list for signature generation, something that is mandated by the BSP spec.

    WSS4J 1.6 provides support for the BSP 1.1 specification, in so far as it pertains to the core WS-Security specifications that WSS4J supports. The enforcing of BSP compliance for inbound messages is controlled by the WSSConfig class, as per WSS4J 1.5.x. An important change is that BSP compliance is now turned on by default. In addition, a new WSHandlerConstants configuration parameter has been added so that BSP compliance can be controlled via a WSHandler implementation.